Reconnecting Syria: People, Trade and Recovery Through the Lens of Border Data, 2024-2026

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 triggered a rapid, if turbulent, reopening of Syria’s commercial and trade corridors. Within days of the transition, new governing bodies were stood up to manage land, sea, and air border points — and the data collected since then tells a story of accelerating trade recovery punctuated by protectionist disruptions, major port concession deals, and a civil aviation sector reviving from near-zero.

This briefing aggregates publicly available datasets and official statements from the Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Border Crossings (subsequently restructured as the General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs), Syrian General Authority of Civil Aviation and Air Transport (GACA), the United Nations Logistics Cluster, and bilateral trade data from Jordan, Türkiye, and Lebanon. It covers the period from December 2024 through February 2026, spanning Syria’s first full calendar year under transitional governance.

The data reveal a country reconnecting with global trade at speed: over 364,000 trucks moved goods across land crossings in the first nine months alone, Syrian ports welcomed nearly 1,000 ships, and international flights resumed at Damascus International Airport in January 2025 after years of conflict-era restrictions. Yet persistent infrastructure deficits, aging transport fleets, and the February 2026 ban on foreign trucks have introduced friction that threatens the momentum of the recovery.

Institutional Reform: The New Border Authority

On 31 December 2024, just weeks after Assad’s fall, the Syrian Prime Ministry announced the creation of the General Authority for Land and Sea Border Crossings — a new body attached to the Council of Ministers with administrative and financial independence. The move dissolved the former customs police structure, with the new Director General issuing a formal decision on 18 December 2024 to reconstitute it in a manner that “serves the public interest.” By 25 December, the General Customs Directorate had already dismissed and replaced border crossing directors at multiple land and sea points.

The institutional architecture was restructured again in November 2025. Presidential Decree No. 244 established the General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs, reporting directly to the Presidency of the Republic rather than the Council of Ministers. The decree consolidated oversight of land and maritime crossings, free zones, customs, port management, and maritime transport under a single body — an arrangement commentators described as a centralisation of Syria’s financial and frontier gateways. Qutaiba Ahmed Badawi, who previously oversaw commercial operations for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham including management of the Bab al-Hawa crossing, was appointed head of the new authority with ministerial rank.

The new authority’s mandate extends beyond day-to-day operations: it is tasked with developing unified electronic interconnection between crossings, ports, and free zones; adopting international digital standards; and representing Syria in relevant regional and international organisations. In practice, the first 14 months of the transitional period have been marked by a tension between the speed of commercial recovery and the institutional capacity to manage it.

Land Border Crossings

Syria’s land border network connects the country with Türkiye to the north, Jordan to the south, Lebanon to the west, and Iraq to the east. The Nassib-Jaber crossing (Syrian-Jordanian border) and the Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam crossings (Syrian-Turkish border) are historically the highest-volume commercial points. The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 allowed the government to reassert control across most of these crossings for the first time since the civil war fragmented Syrian territory.

Between December 2024 and the end of August 2025 — a nine-month window — Syrian border crossings registered more than 364,000 commercial trucks carrying over 8.7 million tons of goods. This represents a significant rebound from the near-total disruption of the conflict years, when land trade was channelled through a patchwork of faction-controlled crossing points with inconsistent procedures and revenue capture.

A notable development in July 2025 was the decision by the General Authority to open all Syrian border crossings with Türkiye on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week basis, effective 14 July. The move was designed to reduce congestion and facilitate the large-scale return of Syrian nationals from Türkiye, where an estimated 3.5 million Syrians had sought refuge during the conflict. In August 2025, the Authority further announced that Syrian expatriates could cross from Türkiye without prior permission, simplifying a procedure that had required advance authorisation since July 9.

Also in June 2025, Syria and Türkiye signed a memorandum of understanding to reactivate cooperation in international road transport — resuming an agreement originally inked in May 2004. The MoU covers truck crossings, transit movement, Ro-Ro facilities, visa facilitation for professional drivers, and harmonisation of legislative and technical standards. By November 2025, Syria’s Ministry of Transport announced the passage of the first transit convoy crossing Syrian territory toward Gulf countries from Türkiye — the first such convoy in years — entering via the Cilvegozu/Bab al-Hawa border crossing.

Sea Border Crossings & Ports

Syria’s maritime trade flows primarily through two Mediterranean ports: Latakia, the country’s largest seaport and principal container hub, located approximately 40 kilometres from the Turkish border; and Tartus, Syria’s second port, historically specialised in bulk cargo including petroleum and agricultural commodities. Both ports suffered operational degradation during the conflict years and were previously entangled in Russian and Iranian lease arrangements.

From December 2024 through August 2025, Syrian ports registered the docking of nearly 1,000 ships with a combined cargo volume exceeding 5.3 million tons — a figure the transitional government cited as evidence of recovering maritime trade. Over the longer period from December 2024 through November 2025, the ports of Latakia and Tartus together handled 110,000 containers, coinciding with the acceleration of sanction relief and new port concession agreements.

Air Border Crossings

Syria’s civil aviation sector was among the most visibly affected by the transition, and its recovery has been among the most quantifiable. Damascus International Airport (IATA: DAM) — the country’s largest airport, capable of handling virtually all aircraft types including the Airbus A380 and Boeing 747-8 — resumed commercial operations on 18 December 2024 with the first domestic flight to Aleppo. International flights resumed formally on 7 January 2025, the first since the regime’s fall.

Aleppo International Airport reopened in March 2025 following a comprehensive rehabilitation programme that included upgrades to the parallel runway with navigational lighting, restoration of the security perimeter, and enhancement of air traffic control communication systems. Passenger halls, immigration, and customs facilities were also refurbished. Seven airlines were operating at Aleppo by October 2025, when the airport handled 33,000 travelers on 370 flights in a single month.

The Syrian General Authority of Civil Aviation and Air Transport (GACA) reported in August 2025 that 5,326 aircraft were recorded in transit over Syrian airspace that month, representing a 37% increase over July. By that date, more than 14 Arab and international airlines had resumed scheduled flights to Damascus and Aleppo — a nearly fivefold increase in air traffic compared to pre-transition levels. An air services agreement signed with the Sultanate of Oman in 2025 contributed to the expansion, with ongoing discussions targeting additional bilateral aviation agreements.

Air cargo data for Damascus International Airport showed 103 tonnes of outbound cargo and 23 tonnes of inbound cargo in October 2025, according to GACA. Damascus has two parallel runways (3,600 metres each), fully renovated in the 2010s. A landmark $4 billion agreement for the construction of a third passenger terminal was signed with Qatar’s UCC Holding in August 2025; the facility, inspired in geometric form by the Damascus sword, is intended to raise total airport capacity to 31 million passengers per year once complete. Rehabilitation of Deir ez-Zor Airport is expected to begin in 2026, further extending domestic air connectivity.

Trade Flows by Partner Country

The lifting of international sanctions — the EU in May 2025 and the US (via executive order) in June 2025 — unlocked bilateral trade growth that had been constrained since 2011. Mirror trade statistics from Syria’s partners provide the clearest available picture of the volume and direction of flows, given the acknowledged limitations in Syria’s own statistical capacity.

Türkiye is Syria’s dominant trade partner, with exports to Syria reaching $2.5 billion in 2025 — a 70% increase over the prior year and reflecting Türkiye’s role as the principal regional backer of President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government. Syrian imports from Türkiye rose roughly 60% compared to 2024. However, Syria’s exports to Türkiye declined by approximately half over the same period — a dynamic generating frustration among Syrian industrialists who warn of a growing trade deficit.

Jordan’s bilateral trade with Syria almost doubled to $432 million in the first 11 months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, with Jordanian exports accounting for 66% of the volume — a 351% increase year-on-year, according to Jordan’s Department of Statistics. The volume of lorry traffic at the Jaber-Nassib crossing — the only land crossing between the two countries — far exceeded pre-transition levels: 150 lorries per day carrying goods from Gulf countries alone were transiting via Jordan’s Aqaba port into Syria by early 2026.

Syrian crude oil exports also resumed through maritime channels: in September 2025, Syria exported 600,000 barrels of heavy crude oil from Tartus, marking the first such shipment since the regime’s fall. Syria’s total exports for H1 2025 reached $580 million, a 39% rise over the same period the previous year, driven largely by agricultural commodities, phosphate, and early-stage oil resumption.

What Syria Exports: Products & Destinations

Syria’s export profile has undergone a fundamental structural shift since the onset of the civil war in 2011. Crude oil, which once accounted for 67% of total Syrian exports and peaked at around $12 billion in 2010, has been almost entirely displaced as the dominant export commodity. In its place, agricultural and food-based exports now form the backbone of Syria’s outward trade — led above all by olive oil, cotton, spices, nuts, and phosphates. In 2024, Syria’s total export value was approximately $820 million to $1.25 billion, representing an enormous decline from the pre-war level but a gradual recovery from the nadir of $554 million recorded in 2018. For H1 2025, total exports reached $580 million — up 39% on the same period of 2024 — with resumption of oil exports from Tartus in September 2025 expected to drive a further step-change.

Top Export Products (2024 — Estimated Values)

Olive oil is Syria’s single most valuable export and a product of growing international commercial significance. In 2023, Syria exported $256.75 million in olive oil; by 2024, this figure rose to an estimated $303 million — an 18% increase year-on-year. Syria’s olive-growing regions, concentrated in the coastal mountains and the Idlib countryside, were among the areas that experienced the least agricultural disruption during the conflict. The lifting of EU and US sanctions has significantly expanded market access: EU member states — particularly Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Spain — are now the primary destination for Syrian olive oil, with the European bloc collectively absorbing a substantial share of the agricultural export portfolio.

Cotton has historically been Syria’s most reliable agricultural export crop, grown primarily in the Euphrates and Khabur river valleys. In 2024, raw cotton exports increased 5.6% year-on-year to approximately $52 million. The sector has significant recovery potential: pre-war, Syria’s vertically integrated cotton industry (from field to finished textile) was a cornerstone of the Aleppo and Damascus manufacturing base. Phosphate is the major mineral export, with Syria holding an estimated 1.7 billion tonnes of reserves near Palmyra. The first phosphate shipment since the transition — 10,000 tonnes departing Tartus in April 2025 — marked the re-entry of this commodity into global trade flows. Crude oil exports resumed through maritime channels in September 2025 with 600,000 barrels of heavy crude shipped from Tartus — the first oil export in 14 years following the removal of Western sanctions.

What Syria Imports: Products & Origins

Syria faces a deep structural import dependency that has intensified through the conflict years. Total imports in 2023 were approximately $3.64 billion, yielding a trade deficit of $2.93 billion. With sanctions lifted in 2025 and demand for reconstruction materials, food, fuel, and consumer goods surging, the total import volume for 2025 is estimated to have increased dramatically — far exceeding the 2024 figure of approximately $6.4 billion. Growth rates from individual partner countries confirm the scale of the surge: imports from Jordan rose 351%, from Saudi Arabia 223%, from Türkiye 60%, and from Lebanon 83%, all in 2025 compared to 2024.

Top Import Categories (2025 — Leading Products)

February 2026: The Non-Syrian Truck Ban

On 6 February 2026, Syria’s General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs issued a decree prohibiting non-Syrian trucks from entering Syrian territory through land border crossings. Under the new rules, goods must be transferred between foreign and Syrian trucks at the customs yard (“al-Tabbun”) at each crossing — a so-called back-to-back or transshipment arrangement. Transit trucks crossing Syrian territory toward third countries were exempted, provided customs police escort them between entry and exit points.

The Syrian government framed the measure as an economic necessity: Syrian truck drivers, who had been largely without work since 2011 when the conflict grounded the national transport fleet, had protested and in some cases attacked foreign drivers. The decree aimed to restore freight revenues to domestic transporters. Muhammad Kishour, president of the International Union of Goods Transport Companies in Syria, described it as a long-overdue corrective, noting that Syrian trucks had been excluded from return loads in Lebanon and Jordan for years.

The practical impact has been severe. Most Syrian transport vehicles are reported to be 30 to 40 years old, with many drivers working independently of registered companies. Border crossing infrastructure — the yards, loading equipment, and logistics capacity needed to support high-volume back-to-back transfers — is inadequate at most crossings. Perishable goods have spoiled during delays. Consumer prices in Syrian markets have risen, with particular concern raised ahead of Ramadan 2026 and its associated spike in demand. Lebanon, whose truck drivers blocked the Masnaa / Jdaidet Yabous crossing in protest on 10 February 2026, sought an exemption.

As of the date of this briefing, negotiations between Syrian and Jordanian authorities were ongoing regarding phased implementation and infrastructure improvements to the customs yards. The measure, if maintained in its current form, risks diverting Jordan-origin cargo toward the Port of Latakia as an alternative entry route, altering established trade flows across the region.

Outlook & Implications

Syria’s border crossing data from December 2024 through early 2026 presents a picture of rapid, unevenly managed recovery. The headline figures — hundreds of thousands of trucks, nearly a thousand ships, millions of travelers, and a fivefold increase in air traffic — testify to the release of long-suppressed trade demand following sanctions removal and the restoration of centralised border governance. The major port concession deals with DP World and CMA CGM represent a generational shift in the management and modernisation trajectory of Syrian maritime infrastructure.

Syria’s border data ultimately reflects a country in an accelerated, fragile, and politically complex reconnection with the global economy. The institutional foundations — the General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs, the new port concession regimes, the restored airports — are in place. The challenge ahead is translating commercial momentum into durable, accountable, and transparent governance of Syria’s frontier gateways, in a manner that supports the country’s broader economic recovery while managing the distributional tensions that rapid trade liberalisation invariably generates.